

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BERLIN 06928 191913Z

44

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05

PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 ACDA-05 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 EB-07

DOT-00 IO-10 OMB-01 /077 W  
----- 102848

O R 191701Z DEC 75

FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1848

AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USBERLIN IMMEDIATE UNN

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 6928

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, PFOR, WB, GE, GW

SUBJECT: INNER-GERMAN TRANSIT NEGOTIATIONS

### SUMMARY:

STATE SECRETARY GAUS, WHO HEADS THE FRG PERMANENT REPRESENTATION IN EAST BERLIN, INVITED THE BRITISH AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS AND THE US CHARGE TO MEET WITH HIM AT NOON ON DECEMBER 19. GAUS SAID THE LIMP SUM AGREEMENT AND OTHER EXCHANGES WOULD BE SIGNED IN EAST BERLIN BEGINNING AT 1615 TODAY. HE THEN COMMENTED ON THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR OUTCOME. GAUS WAS AT PAINS TO EMPHASIZE THAT HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO CALL ON HIS THREE GUESTS SEPARATELY. HE HAD NOT INVITED THEM AS ANY KIND OF "GROUP", BUT TIME WAS SHORT AND WOULD WE CONSIDER OUR PRESENCE AROUND THE TABLE AS THREE SEPARATE CALLS. END SUMMARY:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BERLIN 06928 191913Z

1. GAUS SAID THERE WERE A FEW POINTS HE WANTED TO NOTE, SOME OF WHICH WERE NOT NEW BUT WERE WORTH MENTIONING AT THE TIME OF SIGNING. FOR EXAMPLE, HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT THE TRANSIT AGREEMENT CONTAINED A REVIEW CLAUSE TO PERMIT THE FRG AFTER 2 YEARS TO SEE WHETHER THE LUMP SUM TRANSIT PAYMENTS ACTUALLY MATCHED THE FLOW OF TRAFFIC. THE FRG WOULD BE PREPARED ON THE BASIS OF SUCH AN EXAMINATION TO REVISE PAYMENTS UP OR DOWN. THE AGREEMENT HAS A LIFE OF FOUR YEARS, RATHER THAN THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD SOUGHT BY THE GDR, IN ORDER TO MOVE ITS EXPIRATION DATE AWAY FROM FEDERAL ELECTIONS. ALSO, GAUS, AND HIS GDR COUNTERPART, STATE SECRETARY SCHALCK, WILL INITIAL ("PARAPHIEREN") ALL DOCUMENTS TODAY INCLUDING THOSE OF THE BERLIN SENAT.

2. THE GDR HAS SET A FOUR YEAR CONSTRUCTION DEADLINE FOR HIGHWAY PROJECTS, WHICH SEEMS AMBITIOUS TO WEST GERMAN EXPERTS WHO BELIEVE A FIVE TO SIX YEAR PERIOD IS MORE REALISTIC. ROAD REPAIRS WILL BE EXTENSIVE, AMOUNTING TO FULL RESURFACING. THE GDR WILL PURCHASE FRG CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT. THE FIGURE AGREED UPON FOR WORK ON THE BERLIN-HELMSTEDT AUTOBAHN IS 330 MILLION MARKS, 65 PERCENT OF WHICH WILL BE PAID BY THE FRG. WORK ON THE BERLIN RING WILL BE 75 MILLION MARKS, OF WHICH THE FRG WILL PAY 60 PERCENT OVER FOUR YEARS OF CONSTRUCTION. PERCENTAGES ARE BASED ON ESTIMATES OF FRG USE OF THESE ARTERIES. PRICES HAD BEEN FIXED, AS A HEDGE AGAINST INFLATION.

3. THE GDR HAS AGREE TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING A BERLIN-HAMBUR

AUTOBAHN IN 1978. THE EAST GERMANS HAVE ALSO AGREED THAT THIS AUTOBAHN WILL ENTER WEST BERLIN IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE CITY, A POINT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO BERLIN CITY PLANNERS. CONCERNING WORK ON THE HELMSTEDT AUTOBAHN, SCHALCK PROVIDED ASSURANCES THAT THE GDR WILL ADHERE TO THE TTA, AND THAT THIS AGREEMENT WILL ALSO APPLY TO ANY DETOURS NECESSITATED BY CONSTRUCTION WORK. OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATIONS, GAUS HAS BEEN ASSURED THAT THERE WILL BE NO DETOURS ON THE HELMSTEDT AUTOBAHN FOR ALLIED TRAFFIC DURING THE PERIOD OF CONSTRUCTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BERLIN 06928 191913Z

4. REGARDING TRAIN FACILITIES, A FIGURE OF 51 MILLION MARKS WAS AGREED. OF THIS AMOUNT 30 MILLION MARKS WILL GO TO WEST BERLIN FIRMS FOR CONSTRUCTION. THE ONLY WORK IN THE WESTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN WHICH THE GDR WILL PERFORM WILL TAKE PLACE ON LANDS BELONGING TO THE REICHSBAHN

5. GAUS SAID THE MOST DIFFICULT BARGAINING ON BOTH SIDES CONCERNED THE OPENING OF A NEW TRAFFIC CROSSING POINT IN WEST BERLIN. THE MOST THE GDR COULD AGREE TO WAS THAT A NEW POINT WILL BE OPENED IN THE NORTHERN PART OF BERLIN BY THE FALL OF 1976. THE GDR WAS UNABLE TO COMMIT ITSELF TO EITHER THE PROSPECTIVE HEILIGENSEE OR FROHNAU CROSSING POINTS.

6. GAUS SAID HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO MAKE A FEW POLITICAL OBSERVATIONS. FIRST, IT WAS A SOURCE OF GREAT SATISFACTION THAT ALL QUESTIONS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING ESPECIALLY THOSE AFFECTING WEST BERLIN, HAD BEEN SETTLED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FRG AND GDR. ONLY TODAY DOES THE SENAT HAVE ITS FIRST DIRECT ROLE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IN FORMALIZING SOME OF THE AGREEMENTS. POLICICALLY THE FRG REGARDS THIS AS A VERY IMPORTANT POINT, BUT, WITH AN EYE TO THE FUTURE , ONE IT DOES NOT INTEND TO PLAY UP IN PUBLIC.

7. GAUS DESCRIBED HIS NEGOTIATING PARTNER SCHALCK, A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF BEIL AND THREE MONTHS AGO PROMOTED TO STATE SECRETARY IN THE MINIS

-  
TRY OF FOREIGN TRADE, AS A TOUGH PARTNER WHO KEPT IDEOLOGY OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, UNLIKE NIER OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WHO HAS AN IDEO

LOGICAL SUPERSTRUCTURE FOR EVERY ISSUE. SCHALCK, A MAN IN HIS MID-FORTIES, TALKED TO THE POINT, AND SEEMED AT ALL TIMES FULLY EMPOWERED. GAUS BELIEVES THE DECISION TO USE SCHALCK WAS MADE AT THE TOP POLITICAL ECHELON OF THE GDR REGIME. THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REMAINED AN APPARATUS TO ONE SIDE, A COLLECTION OF EXPERTS DRAWN INTO NEGOTIATIONS AT SUCH TIMES AS THEY WERE NEEDED.

8. SCHALCK AND GAUS NEGOTIATED ALONE FOR THE PAST THREE WEEKS, MEETING  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BERLIN 06928 191913Z

IN GAUS'S HOME BECAUSE SCHALCK DID NOT WANT TO USE THE MINISTRY OR COME TO FRG OFFICES. HE WOULD ARRIVE ON FOOT HAVING PARKED HIS CAR AT LEAST A BLOCK AWAY. THERE HAD BEEN NO LEAKS OF THESE PRIVATE TALKS AND IT WAS THIS STYLE OF DIRECT ONE-ON-ONE NEGOTIATION THAT HAD MADE THE RESULTS POSSIBLE. THE CRUNCH CAME LAST SATURDAY WHEN FINAL POINTS WERE AGREED.

9. AS TO THE ROLE OF THE SOVIETS IN EAST BERLIN, GAUS SAID THAT SCHALAK SOMETIMES MENTIONED WITH REFERENCE TO A WEST BERLIN ISSUE, SUCH AS THE NEW CROSSING POINT IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE CITY, THAT HE COULD GO NO FURTHER BECAUSE OF THE WISHES OF THE "BIG PARTNER." YET SCHALCK DID MANAGE LATER ON TO OBTAIN SOME NEW GROUND,AS IN BEING ABLE TO SPECIFY AT THE END OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT THERE WOULD

BE A NEW CROSSING POINT IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE CITY, A FACT  
INDICATING GDR-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS.

10. ON TWO OCCASIONS, SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE GDR ABRASIMOV ASKED  
GAUS HOW THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE GOING. GAUS INFORMED HIM AND GOT THE  
IMPRESSION THAT ABRASIMOV WAS NOT FULLY AWARE OF EVERY IMPORTANT  
ASPECT OF THESE TALKS.

11. GAUS DID NOT REFER TO THE GDR STALLING REPORTED IN BERLIN 6927.  
WE  
LEARNED SEPARATELY THAT THE  
GDR' FORMAL AGREEMENT TO THE OUTCOME OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WAS  
RECEIVED  
BY THE FRG AT 10 P.M. ON THE EVENING OF DECEMBER 18. THE FRG VIEW  
HERE  
REMAINS THAT THE EAST GERMANS WERE FINDING THE GOING DIFFICULT IN  
THE GLARE OF PUBLICITY ACCORDED FORCED ADOPTION. PERHAPS THE  
EXCLUSION  
OF THE "SPIEGEL" CORRESPONDENT HAD BEEN A FACE SAVING PREREQUISITE  
BEFORE THE REGIME COULD PROCEED WITH THE AGREEMENT. GROVE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** TRANSPORTATION, MEETINGS, NEGOTIATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 19 DEC 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** ElyME  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975BERLIN06928  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750442-0093  
**From:** BERLIN  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19751225/aaaaavwh.tel  
**Line Count:** 189  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** ElyME  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 28 MAY 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <28 MAY 2003 by MartinML>; APPROVED <22 OCT 2003 by ElyME>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** INNER-GERMAN TRANSIT NEGOTIATIONS SUMMARY  
**TAGS:** PGOV, PFOR, WB, GC, GE  
**To:** STATE USBERLIN  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006